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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James D. Kirk appeals from the judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a 
minor under 16 and sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age following a jury 
trial. On appeal, Mr. Kirk asserts that he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial when the prosecuting attorney, in 
her rebuttal closing, sang the first verse of the Confederate anthem Dixie in this 
prosecution of a black man for alleged sex crimes against two female victims who 
appeared to be white. 
Mr. Kirk the Idaho Supreme Court this and hold that 
prosecutorial misconduct that injects race into a criminal trial should treated as 
structural error, requiring automatic reversal even when no contemporaneous objection 
is made. Alternatively, although the error was not objected-to, Mr. Kirk maintains that it 
satisfied the fundamental error test set forth by this Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209 (2010), such that it requires reversal and a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
James D. Kirk was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and sexual 
battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age. (R., pp.19-20.) The charges against 
Mr. Kirk arose from allegations that he had sex with two minor females: then-17 year old 
J.C. and then-13 year old M.F. (4/2/13 Tr., p.208, L.4 - p.210, L.12.) Both victims 
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to be white, 1 while Mr. Kirk is black. (Officer Report for Incident N12-30075, 
13 (appended to I); R., p.8; PSI, p.1.) 
During the State's rebuttal closing, the prosecuting attorney opened her 
argument as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, when I was a kid we used to like to sings [sic] 
songs a lot. I always think of this one song. Some people know it It's the 
Dixie song. Right? Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not 
forgotten. Look away. Look away. Look away. And isn't that really what 
you've kind of been asked to do? Look away from the two eyewitnesses. 
Look away from the two victims. Look away from the nurse in her medical 
opinion. Look away. Look away. Look away. 
(4/4/13 Tr., p.187, L.25 
188, Ls.8-13.) 
Dixie has long 
p.i88, L.9.) Defense counsel did not object. (4/4/13 
considered the facto national anthem of the Confederacy. 
Charles Burleigh Galbreath, Daniel Decatur Emmett: Author of "Dixie" 20 n.1 (Press of 
Fred J. Heer 1904); Bruce G. Kauffmann, 'Dixie' Quickly Became Confederate Anthem, 
The Kentucky Post, April 4, 2005, at K4. Given its history, it is particularly loaded, and 
"has come to symbolize everything wrong with race relations in the South." No more 
Dixie, The Washington Times, July 31, 1999, at 11. "Dixie and the [Confederate battle] 
flag became symbols of resistance to civil rights in Mississippi in 1948, the year 
Mississippi was one of four states to support the Dixiecrat ticket on the national ballot." 
Michael Kelley, Shadow of the Flag: Black Alumni of Ole Miss See Gradual Change, Yet 
Frustrations, The Commercial Appeal, October 26,1997, at E1. 
1 While the police reports for the incident list M.F.'s race as "w" (for white), M.F., in her 
victim impact statement, wrote, "It is very hard for me to look at an African Amer- --
African men the same way and also to trust people. I have always had a dream to meet 
my birth father, but now I am super scared because he is African American." (6/7/13 
Tr., p.321, Ls.1-5.) 
2 
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Kirk on both counts, and he 
unified of twenty with eight years fixed. (6/7/13 Tr., p.371, 
L.13 p.372, L.3.) Mr. Kirk filed a timely Notice Appeal. (R., p.217.) 
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ISSUE 
Were Mr. Kirk's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial 
violated by the State's unobjected-to misconduct in singing the Confederate anthem 
Dixie during closing arguments when Mr. Kirk, a black man, was on trial for alleged sex 
crimes against two female victims who appeared to be white? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Kirk's Constitutional Rights To Due Process, Equal Protection, And A Fair Trial 
Were Violated By The State's Unobiected-To Misconduct In Singing Dixie Duri!l9. 
Closing Arguments When Mr. Kirk, A Black Man, VVas On Trial For Alleged Sex Crimes 
Against Two Female Victims Who Appeared To Be White 
A. Introduction 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CON ST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ... 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 8mend. 
XIV. The Idaho Constitution guarantees that, "[n]o person shall ... deprived of iife, 
liberty or property without due process of law." 10. CONST. art. I, §1 It further provides, 
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit .... " 10. CONST. art. I, § 2. Due process requires criminal trials 
to be fundamentally fair. Schwarlzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). 
Prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
756, 765 (1987). 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that 
"every defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to due process" and "[iJt is 
axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'" Id. at 
225 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). The Court went on to note, 
[IJt is a violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial 
for a prosecutor to attempt to have a jury reach its decision on any factor 
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence 
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence. 
Id. at 227. 
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During the State's rebuttal closing, the prosecuting attorney opened 
ment as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, when I was a kid we used to like to sings [sic] 
songs a lot. I always think of this one song. Some people know it. It's the 
Dixie song. Right? Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not 
forgotten. Look away. Look away. Look away. And isn't that really what 
you've kind of been asked to do? Look away from the two eyewitnesses. 
Look away from the two victims. Look away from the nurse in her medical 
opinion. Look away. Look away. Look away. 
(4/4/13 Tr., p.187, L.25- p.188, L.9.) 
Mr. Kirk asserts that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she 
the first verse of the Confederate anthem Dixie during her rebuttal closing 
argument, most notably because it served to inject race into a case in which a black 
man was charged with sex crimes against two female victims, both of whom appeared2 
to be white. In doing so, the prosecutor violated Mr. Kirk's due process rights to have 
the case decided on the merits, equal protection, and a fair trial. 
Mr. Kirk asserts that the proper way to treat claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
involving the injection of race into a criminal trial is as structural error, requiring an 
automatic reversal despite the lack of any contemporaneous objection. Alternatively, in 
light of the historical significance of the song Dixie, which will be detailed infra, and the 
nature of the charges and parties involved, the misconduct, while not objected to, rises 
to the level of fundamental error necessitating reversal for a new trial. 
2 See note 1. 
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B. Mr. Kirk's Constitutional Rights To Due Process, Equal Protection, And A Fair 
Trial Were Violated By The State's Unobjected-To Misconduct In Singing "Dixie" 
During Closing Arguments When Mr. Kirk, A Black Man, Was On Trial For 
Alleged Sex Crimes Against Two Female Victims Who Appeared To Be White 
1. The Historical Significance Of Dixie 
According to a biography of Daniel Decatur Emmett, the man who wrote Dixie, 
"[t]he circumstances under which Dixie became the war song of the Confederacy are 
substantially as follows:" 
In the spring of 1861, a spectacular performance was to be given in New 
Orleans. The parts had all been agreed upon, except a song for the grand 
chorus that should arouse enthusiasm and stir the Southern blood. Many 
songs were suggested, but none proved entirely satisfactory. Dixie was 
tried and given the place of honor. The great that heard it was 
thrilled. Encore followed encore in the midst of wild demonstrations of 
approval. It then rapidly spread throughout the South and became the 
rallying cry of the Confederacy. 
Galbreath, supra, at 20 (footnote omitted). Shortly after the above-described New 
Orleans performance, at which the audience demanded seven encores, "The saloons, 
the parlors, the streets rang with the 'Dixie' air, and 'Dixie' became to the South what 
the 'Marseillaise'el is to France." Id. at 20 n.1 (internal citation omitted). 
Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist created controversy when, at a judicial conference 
in Virginia in 1999, he included Dixie in his annual "Old Fashioned Sing-along." Craig 
Timberg, Rehnquist's Inclusion of 'Dixie' Strikes a Sour Note, Washington Post, July 22, 
1999, at 81. The sing-along, which was led by Rehnquist, was held after dinner on the 
first night of the conference, and as a result, "some African American lawyers say they 
avoided the sing-along ... because of their distaste for 'Dixie,' which was a marching 
song of Confederate troops during the Civil War and was played at Jefferson Davis's 
3 Marseillaise, written in 1792, is the French national anthem. THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
REFERENCE DICTIONARY 885 (2d ed. 1996). 
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inauguration as Confederate president in 1861." Id. '''Dixie' was penned by a 'black-
singer from the North the Civil War. But with the opening line 'I wish I was 
in the land of cotton,' it has become a racially charged symbol of Old Southern pride." 
Id. 
Author and historian Howard L. Sacks has explained, "Both the battle flag of the 
Confederacy and 'Dixie' gained a racist cast to them as they were taken on by 
segregationists." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Federal Judge U.W. Clemon 
of Birmingham, who is African American, said the song 'symbolizes a determination to 
keep things as they were, that is, to keep blacks in a subservient position.'" Id. The 
president of the National Association, "a group of 18,000 African Americans in 
legal profession, explained, would be very, very troubled to learn that the chief 
justice did that [led a sing-along that included Dixie]" because "[t]o us, that song is a 
vestige of the badges of slavery." Id. While noting that "[m]isspellings and ethnic 
pronunciations of words do not appear in most contemporary versions of the song," the 
Washington Post article explained, "Its lyrics are in the stereotyped voice of African 
Americans as they supposedly long for a return to plantation life and slavery." Id. 
In Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972), the Sixth Circuit explained 
some of the racial tensions aroused by the use of the Confederate battle flag and the 
song Dixie at Brainerd High School, a formerly-segregated public school in Tennessee.4 
Prior to 1966, Brainerd was all-white, and "had adopted as its nickname the word 
'Rebel' and used the Confederate flag as the school flag along with the song Dixie as its 
pep song." Melton, 465 F.2d at 1333. By the 1969 school year, "the student body 
became racially polarized as a result of continuing controversy over the use of the 
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flag and the song Dixie at various school functions." Id. The school 
and P.T.A. formed a committee that recommended "[a]s a corrective 
measure ... that the use of the Confederate flag as a school symbol and the use of the 
song Dixie as the school pep song be discontinued but that the nickname 'Rebel' be 
retained." Consistent with the committee's recommendation, the school board adopted 
a code provision that provided, "The song 'Dixie' can no longer be used as a fight or pep 
song at Pep Meetings, Athletic contests or other school functions. It may be played in 
concern when other music of similar kind composes the program." Id. at 1333-34. 
Several music historians have described Dixie as being "synonymous with 
slavery, racism and hatred." Levin, 'Dixie' now too symbolic of old South, not of 
origins, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 4, 1998, available http://old/post-
gazette.com/regionstate/19980904dixie4.asp. "Horace Clarence Boyer, a black 
professor of music theory and African-American music at the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst," has said that while "[s]ome songs have a broad 
acceptance," Dixie is not among them. Id. Professor Boyer noted, "You don't have to 
explain why you're playing 'The Star-Spangled Banner.' You don't have to explain why 
you're playing 'America the Beautiful.' It has to be explained why somebody is playing 
'Dixie' - unless it's the Ku Klux Klan." Id. 
2. Injection Of Race As Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Appellate courts uniformly disapprove of the prosecutorial injection of race into 
criminal trials, as misconduct in violation of the United States Constitution. See State v. 
Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1241 (Haw. 1999) (,,[R]eferences to race that do not have an 
4 The case itself concerned the propriety of disciplining a student for wearing a small 
Confederate flag on his clothing. Melton, 465 F.2d at 1334. 
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objectively legitimate purpose constitute a particularly form of prosecutorial 
misconduct."); State v. Guthrie, 461 163, 187 (W. Va. 1995) ("Appellate cou rts 
give strict scrutiny to cases involving the alleged wrongful injection of race, gender, or 
religion in criminal cases. Where these issues are wrongfully injected, reversal is 
usually the result.") (citations omitted); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 n. 30 
(1987) ('The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.") (citation 
omitted). The law is clear and well-established: prosecutorial appeals to race violate the 
United States Constitution. 
Even "subtle, indirect, or veiled" appeals to race constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct. Explaining decision to reverse a murder conviction on the basis of race-
prosecutorial misconduct in which the prosecutor essentially accused defense 
counsel of using code words to refer to African-American witnesses, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court explained, 
Bias often surfaces indirectly or inadvertently and can be difficult to detect. 
We emphasize, nonetheless, that the improper injection of race "can affect 
a juror's impartiality and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to 
the fullest extent possible." Affirming this conviction would undermine our 
strong commitment to rooting out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or 
veiled. 
State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W. 2d 469, 475 (Minn. 2005) (internal citation omitted). 
In McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit 
considered the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought "on the ground 
that his constitutional rights were denied by the prosecutor's inclusion of improper racist 
remarks in the summation." McFarland, 611 F.2d at 415. The petitioner was convicted 
of selling heroin following a trial at which "the State's case depended almost entirely on 
the testimony of Patricia Dorman, a Rochester undercover police officer." Id. Officer 
Dorman testified that she purchased $450 worth of heroin from the petitioner, whom she 
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knew from high school and had seen on occasion since then, an apartment building. 
Id. The defense presented testimony from a friend of the petitioner that he and the 
petitioner had gone to the apartment building to meet two prostitutes, who never 
showed up, and that he saw Officer Dorman in the company of two Puerto Rican men 
before she left the building without interacting with the petitioner. Id. 
In closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury should consider whether Officer 
Dorman, an African-American woman, would lie about "a member of her own race. You 
use your common sense to think about that." Id. at 416. In rejecting the State's attempt 
to uphold the conviction because the prosecutor's statements were not the "racial slurs" 
found to inappropriate in United States ex reI. Haynes v. McKendrick,481 F.2d 1 
(2d Cir. 1973), the court explained, 
Neither Haynes nor the lines of authority on which it drew set the 
constitutional limits for improper prosecution argument at racial slurs. 
Race is an impermissible basis for any adverse governmental action in the 
absence of compelling justification. When a prosecutor's summation 
includes racial remarks in an effort to persuade a jury to return a guilty 
verdict, the resulting conviction is constitutionally unfair unless the 
remarks are abundantly justified. To raise the issue of race is to draw the 
jury's attention to a characteristic that the Constitution generally 
commands us to ignore. Even a reference that is not derogatory may 
carry impermissible connotations, or may trigger prejudiced responses in 
the listeners that the speaker might neither have predicted nor intended . 
. . . But given the general requirement that the race of a criminal defendant 
must not be the basis of any adverse inference, any reference to it by a 
prosecutor must be justified by a compelling state interest. 
Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added). 
The Sixth Circuit has explained, "Appeals to racial prejudice [by prosecutors] are 
foul blows and the courts of this country reject them." United States V. Grey, 422 F.2d 
1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 1970). In Grey, a bank robbery prosecution, the United States 
Attorney asked a character witness for Grey "whether he knew that Grey, a Negro, and 
11 
a married man, was 'running around with a white go~go dancer.'" Id. 1044-45. 
objection was overruled and a motion for mistrial was denied. Id. at 1045. The court 
could "find no nonprejudicial explanation for the 'white go-go dancer' question asked by 
the United States Attomey," and explained, "At the entire question was a 
magnificent irrelevance in a prosecution for bank robbery ... At worst, the gratuitous 
reference to the race of the go-go dancer may be read as a deliberate attempt to 
employ racial prejudice to strengthen the hand of the United States government." Id. In 
reversing, the court explained, "Where, as here, the facts are such as to indicate that 
such prejudicial tactics may have had a substantial influence upon the result of trial, 
for new trial is ordered." Id. 1046 (citations omitted). 
In Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978), the Circuit 
considered whether a prosecutor's unobjected~to comments in a rape case involving 
black defendants and a white alleged victim required that the convictions be vacated. 
The court began by noting, "A prejudicial argument by the prosecutor poses a serious 
threat to a fair tria!." Miller, 583 F.2d at 706. The court cited to Judge Frank's 
"trenchant" dissent in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 
1946), a wartime prosecution in which the prosecutor made appeals to patriotism, to 
demonstrate "why such arguments are so objectionable." Id. The Fourth Circuit quoted 
the following from Judge Frank's dissent: 
A jury trial, at best, is chancy. "Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy are the 
names of witnesses whose testimony is not recorded, but must 
nevertheless be reckoned with * * *"; and most jurors have no trained 
capacity for doing so. A keen observer has said that "next to perjury, 
prejudice is the main cause of miscarriages of justice." If government 
counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by irrelevantly 
arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a 
lethal weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He 
should not be permitted to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice. Law 
suits, do what we will, are hazardous: A missing witness, a lost document 
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these and numerous other fortuitous factors may result in a man's losing 
his life, liberty or property unjustly. When the government puts a citizen to 
the hazards of a criminal jury trial, a government attorney should not 
allowed to increase those hazards unfairly. 
155 F .2d at 658-59 (citations omitted). 
Miller, 583 F.2d at 706 n.7. 
Discussing the perils of racially prejudicial comments in sex crime prosecutions, 
the court cautioned, "Concern about fairness should be especially acute where a 
prosecutor's argument appeals to race prejudice in the context of a sexual crime, for 
few forms of prejudice are so virulent.,,5 Id. at 707. The court went on to explain, "one 
of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 
and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is eradication of racial considerations 
from criminal proceedings." Id. (citation omitted). 
In this prosecution of a black man for alleged sex crimes committed against two 
female victims who were - or appeared to be - white, the prosecutor sang the de facto 
national anthem of the Confederacy. Doing so impermissibly injected racial 
considerations into the type of case in which the Miller Court cautioned concerns about 
fairness should of the utmost importance given the "virulent" prejudice against interracial 
relationships that have long existed in this nation, and the fact that such prejudice is still 
openly advocated, as the Ian Johnson proposal threats show. In light of this, the 
5 It is likely that courts take the injection of race into sex crime prosecutions so seriously 
because it has been less than 50 years since the United States Supreme Court struck 
down anti-miscegenation laws in sixteen states. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). In the fifteen years preceding Loving, Idaho and thirteen other states finally 
repealed laws banning interracial marriage. Id. at 6 n. 5. As recently as 2007, Boise 
State's Ian Johnson received dozens of calls, letters, and "personal threats" after he 
proposed to his white girlfriend on national television after scoring the winning two-point 
conversion in the Fiesta Bowl. Boise State's Johnson receives racial threats, The 
Seattle Times, July 25, 2007, at D3. 
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racial into the prosecution Mr. Kirk especially heinous 
This Court Should Hold That The Unobjected-To Injection Of Race Into A 
Criminal Trial By The State Constitutes Structural Error, Requiring 
Automatic Reversal, Or At The Very Least, Shift The Burden Of Proving 
Harmlessness To The State 
Racial prejudice can violently affect a juror's impartiality and must be 
removed from the courtroom proceeding to the fullest extent possible. It 
negates the defendant's right to be tried on the evidence in the case and 
not on extraneous issues. More than just harm to the individual defendant 
is involved, however. For the introduction of racial prejudice into a trial 
helps further embed the already too deep impression in public 
consciousness that there are two standards of justice in the United 
one for and the other for blacks. Such an appearance of duality in 
our racially troubled times is, quite simply, intolerable from the standpoint 
of the future of our society. 
United States ex Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1973) (citations 
omitted). 
The Conference of Chief Justices has found that, "despite significant progress in 
combating racial and ethnic prejudice in the United States, such bias persists in society, 
including government institutions, the courts and the justice system," "sizeable 
segments of society continue to believe that minorities are treated unfairly by the courts 
and that racial and ethnic prejudice impedes fair and equal access to the courts .... " 
Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements and Resolutions, Resolution No. 28 
(Aug. 1, 2002).6 Further, because "bias, either actual or perceived, cannot be tolerated 
by the courts ... the courts have an important responsibility to take the lead role in 
eliminating racial and ethnic bias in the courts and throughout the entire justice system . 
. . . " Id. 
6 Available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/08012002-ln-
Support-of-State-Courts-Responsibility-to-Address-Issues-of-Racial-and-Ethnic.ashx. 
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to public perception, especially among racial minorities, that the criminal 
system is not colorblind,? along with the sensitive nature of racial issues in this 
nation's history, Mr. Kirk asserts that a strong standard of review must be adopted when 
considering prosecutorial misconduct involving the injection of race into a criminal 
prosecution. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 558 (Wash. 2011) (such misconduct 
"fundamentally undermines the principle of equal justice and is so repugnant to the 
concept of an impartial trial its very existence demands that appellate courts set 
appropriate standards to deter such conduct"). 
Not only is such a standard necessary to protect the individual criminal 
defendant, but also to the public's belief in the integrity of the justice system. To 
allow even the perception that race has played a factor in obtaining a criminal conviction 
when it is wholly-irrelevant to the case undermines the integrity of the entire criminal 
justice system.8 Allowing for the chance that race played a role in a criminal conviction 
violates a defendant's rights to a fair trial and equal protection. 
While he asserts that this Court should find such unobjected-to misconduct to be 
structural error, necessitating automatic reversal, he alternatively argues that this Court 
7 A survey conducted in 2000 led the authors of a report for the National Center for 
State Courts to conclude that "[p]erceptions of fairness differ sharply by race and 
ethnicity. For example, among recent court users, nearly half of Whites (49 percet), just 
over one-seventh of African-Americans (15 percent), and four out of ten Latinos (40 
percent) believe that court outcomes are always or usually fair. It is striking that twice 
as many African-Americans believe that outcomes are seldom or never fair as believe 
they are always or usually fair." David B. Rottman & Randall M. Hansen, How Recent 
Court Users View the State Courts: Perceptions of Whites, African-Americans, and 
Latinos 5 (National Center for State Courts 2003), available at 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getdownloaditem/collection/ctcomm/id/18/filen 
ame/19.pdf. 
8 Obviously, in some cases, namely hate crimes, racial issues will not only be relevant 
but, of necessity, playa central role. Mr. Kirk's case is not such a case. 
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require the State to show 
no contemporaneous objection 
a reasonable doubt even when 
Neither the Idaho appellate courts nor the United States Supreme Court has yet 
considered whether the injection of race into a criminal trial constitutes structural error, 
requiring automatic reversal. Two appellate courts have dispensed with the harmless 
error test when dealing with prosecutorial misconduct involving race, holding that it 
constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 708; 
Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 614-15 (Del. 1988) ("[T]he right to a fair trial that is 
of improper racial implications is so basic to the federal Constitution that an 
upon that right can never be harmless error.") (citing Miller). 
noted, the United States Court to rule on the Calhoun v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 1136 (Mem.) (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) ("Yet 
in his petition for writ of certiorari, Calhoun ... contends that the comment should lead 
to automatic reversal because it constitutes either structural error or plain error 
regardless of whether it prejudiced the outcome. Those arguments, however, were 
forfeited when Calhoun failed to press them on appeal to the Fifth Circuit."). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that structural errors "defy 
analysis by harmless error standards" because they have "consequences that are 
necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 148-49 (2006) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Explaining its 
conclusion that the denial of the Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel of choice is 
structural error, the Supreme Court reasoned, "Harmless-error analysis in such a 
context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an altemate 
universe." Id. at 150. 
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The Miller Court explained why it was foregoing the harmless error test, and 
treating the injection of race into a criminal trial as structural error, as follows: 
Where the jury is exposed to highly prejudicial argument by the 
prosecutor's calculated resort to racial prejudice on an issue as sensitive 
as consent to sexual intercourse in a prosecution for rape, we think that 
the prejudice engendered is so great that automatic reversal is required. 
In such a case, the impartiality of the jury as a fact-finder is fatally 
compromised. Because that contamination may affect the jury's 
evaluation of all of the evidence before it, speculation about the effect of 
the error on the verdict is fruitless. Reversal must be automatic. 
Miller, 583 F.2d at 708 (citations omitted). 
Given the fact that, in Mr. Kirk's case, when thirty-four members of the jury panel 
were surveyed by defense counsel, eighteen agreed that "society still uses race as a 
potential factor in certain decisions that are " while "that we as a 
society have moved past the fact that race is a factor in any kind of decision-making" 
(4/2/13 Tr., p.148, L.1 - p.150, L.9), it is obvious that the injection of race into a criminal 
trial is the sort of "unquantifiable and indeterminate" error for which harmless error 
review is impossible. It would require "a speculative inquiry into what might have 
occurred in an alternate universe" to conduct a harmless error analysis when the 
prosecutor has injected racial considerations into a criminal prosecution. In light of the 
impossibility of assessing the impact that the injection of race into a criminal trial has via 
harmless error analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court should hold that such error is 
structural, requiring automatic reversal. 
In the alternative to his argument that this Court should hold that the unobjected-
to injection of race into a criminal trial is structural error, Mr. Kirk respectfully requests 
that this Court place the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt on 
the State. As will be discussed infra, a number of appellate courts have adopted this 
approach when reviewing unobjected-to misconduct that injects race into a criminal trial. 
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Although the Washington Supreme Court recently declined to dispense with the 
error analysis on this issue, it has held that when unobjected-to 
prosecutorial misconduct in which "a prosecutor flagrantly or apparently intentionally 
appeals to racial bias in a way that undermines the defendant's credibility or the 
presumption of innocence, we will vacate the conviction unless it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not affect the jury's verdict," and that "in such 
cases, the burden is on the State." Monday, 257 P.3d at 558 (footnote omitted). 
In United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990), a case in which the 
prosecutor made unobjected-to references to "Jamaicans" dominating the crack cocaine 
in Washington, , the court held that "the Government has the burden of 
establishing that it [the misconduct] was harmless" beyond a reasonable doubt. Doe, 
903 F.2d at 27-28. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "prosecutorial 
remarks kindling racial or ethnic predilections 'can violently affect a juror's impartiality' .. 
. Just how much influence the prosecutor's summation exerted upon the jury is, of 
course, incapable of precise measurement, but its portent for harm is ominous." Id. at 
28 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
If this Court is unwilling to accept Mr. Kirk's invitation to find that the unobjected-
to injection of race into a criminal trial is structural error, requiring automatic reversal, he 
respectfully requests that it modify the typical test for unobjected-to error, and require 
the State to establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Because the misconduct was race-based, this Court should automatically 
reverse, as such misconduct constitutes structural error. Alternatively, this Court should 
shift the burden for such unobjected-to misconduct to the State to establish 
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. In either case, this Court should vacate the 
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judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial which racial 
play no 
Even If This Court Declines Mr. Kirk's Request For A Different Standard Of 
Review, The Prosecutor's Injection Of Race Into This Case Constituted 
Unconstitutional Misconduct Necessitating Reversal Under The Perry Test 
Mr. Kirk asserts that, regardless of how subtle9 or blatant, the injection of race as 
a consideration at a criminal trial violates a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to a fair trial, which includes a decision based solely on the law and 
evidence, and his right to equal protection, especially when the case involves a 
for sex crimes in which the defendant is black and the alleged victims 
or to white. If this Court declines Mr. Kirk's that it 
prosecutorial misconduct that improperly injects race into a criminal trial as structural 
error, or shifts the burden of showing harmlessness to the State, he maintains that the 
error was nevertheless reversible under Perry. 
The standard of review for unobjected to error as set forth by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Perry is as follows: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
9 "Not all appeals to racial prejudice are blatant. Perhaps more effective but just as 
insidious are subtle references. Like wolves in sheep's clothing, a careful word here 
and there can trigger racial bias." Monday, 257 P.3d at 557 (citations omitted). 
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a. The Error Violated One Or More Of Mr. Kirk's Unwaived Constitutional 
Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides, "No State shall. 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1. The government's improper injection of race into a criminal 
trial violates a defendant's right to equal protection. See McKendrick, 481 F.2d at 159 
(explaining that "where a criminal trial is affected by racial prejudice, either in the 
underlying procedure, the atmosphere surrounding the trial or otherwise" is "the point 
where the due process and equal protection clauses overlap or least meet") (footnote 
omitted); Withers v. United 602 F.2d 124, 127 (6th Cir. 1979) (vacating 
convictions due to prosecutor's of race in closing argument, and explaining that 
its opinion "requires that it [the prosecution] be accomplished under equal protection of 
the law"). 
[I]t is a violation of a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial 
for a prosecutor to attempt to have a jury reach its decision on any factor 
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence 
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
b. The Error Is Plain 
The second prong of the Perry analysis for unobjected-to fundamental error is 
whether the error was plain on the face of the record. In this case, for the reasons set 
forth in subsection 8(1), which recounts the historical significance and modern reactions 
to Dixie, as well as the races - or perceived races - of Mr. Kirk and the alleged victims, 
the error in a prosecutor singing the de facto national anthem of the Confederacy, in a 
sex crime prosecution is plain. 
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c. 
The third prong of the analysis is whether the defendant can show that the 
error was not harmless. As noted in subsection 8(3), in support of the argument for the 
adoption of a different standard for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct in improperly 
injecting race into a criminal trial, the sensitivity of race relations in this nation makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what effect racial considerations play in trial. 
With that said, the fol/owing analysis provides a basis for concluding that the 
prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and should 
lead this Court to conclude that it is impossible to say that the misconduct did not, in 
some way, contribute to the verdict. 
In this case, the jury was a rendition of the Confederacy's de facto 
national anthem, Dixie, which, as discussed in detail supra, was adopted by 
segregationists in the 20th century, and is written in the voice of a former slave pining for 
the "good old days" when he was a slave, picking cotton in the South. Given the subject 
matter of the song, the nature of the criminal charges against Mr. Kirk, and the uniform 
condemnation of even subtle appeals to racial bias by countless appellate courts 
because of the difficulty in assessing its impact, Mr. Kirk asserts that the prosecutor's 
misconduct in violation of his due process right to a fair trial at which his guilt or 
innocence was determined solely on the law and evidence and his right to equal 
protection, cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
With respect to the equal protection argument, the prosecutor's singing of Dixie 
could only have had an impact in a case in which the defendant was black, and such an 
impact is even stronger when the alleged crimes are of a sexual nature and the alleged 
victims are - or appear to be - white. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 707 ("Concern about 
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should be especially acute where a prosecutor's argument appeals to race 
prejudice in the context of a sexual crime, for forms of are so virulent."); 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U . 545, 554-55 (1979) ("Discrimination on account of race was 
the primary evil at which the Amendments adopted after the War H.QlrlAJQ the States, 
including the Fourteenth Amendment, were aimed. The Equal Protection Clause was 
central to the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of discriminatory action by the State . 
. . Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in aU aspects, is especially pernicious in 
the administration of justice."). 
As for the due process argument, the singing of such an offensive, racially-
charged subtly and into the inviting the jury to 
decide the case not on the merits, but on the of race. (reversing a 
conviction because the prosecutor asked a single question about the married, black 
defendant purportedly "running around with a white go-go dancer"); Cabrera, 700 N.W. 
2d at 475 ("Affirming this conviction would undermine our strong commitment to rooting 
out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or veiled."). 
The prosecutor's subtle injection of racial bias into this sex crime prosecution of a 
black defendant for alleged offenses committed against female victims who were - or 
appeared to be - white violated Mr. Kirk's unwaived rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The error was plain on the 
face of the record, and it cannot be said that the conduct was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the verdict in this case because of the nature 
of the misconduct and the races - or perceived races - of Mr. Kirk and the alleged 
victims. As such, even if this Court declines Mr. Kirk's request for a strict standard with 
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respect to type of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, his convictions must be 
vacated under the test for unobjected-to error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Kirk respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which race 
is not improperly injected into the proceedings and at which his constitutional rights to 
due process, a fair trial, and equal protection are respected. 
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